Safecasting Fashion

Fri, 11/08/2019 - 01:49

One of the less obvious uses of open data and open licensing is that things can be used in ways that someone might never consider an option with all the traditional hoops that need to be jumped through. While not specifically related to licensing, Tara’s recent post about using bGeigie logs to generate music is an excellent example of using Safecast data in ways it was never intended, with wonderful results. Another example is this rarely seen collaboration with Slow Factory. Several years ago I was talking to Céline Semaan about her work with Slow Factory, a sustainably focused company who was using openly licensed imagery from NASA to bring science into fashion and related conversations.

We talked about the potential to use some Safecast data and visualizations in a similar way, and because the data is public domain and maps openly licensed this could just be done without legal concerns of any time. A few pieces were made and sold out right away, unfortunately before we were able to get photos. Recently Rachel Binx, a data science engineer based in Los Angeles, posted an image of one of her favorite scarfs – and it happened to be from the this collaboration! This scarf is actually part of the “Endangered X Extinct” collection which brings attention to changes in the natural world, and animals that are no longer with us. The pairing of the extinct Carolina Parakeet imagery with Safecast radiation visualizations is both beautiful, but also layered with complexity as humans and human development are directly connected to the Carolina Parakeet’s extinction, and the Safecast radiation map is a reminder of the largely unseen impact we continue to have on our environment.

While these pieces are no longer available, we love that they exist out in the world and would love to see more creative uses of our work, and will highlight them from time to time as we come across them. If you’ve used Safecast data in your project, or have an idea that you’d like to explore – please let us know!

Slow Factory scarf with Safecast data visualizations

Compose Music Using Your Safecast bGeigie Nano Data

Thu, 11/07/2019 - 08:01

Convert Safecast bGeigie CPM Readings To A Midi File in Less Than 10 Minutes!

For the past couple of years, I’ve been inspired by numerous artists that have utilized Safecast radiation data and the bGeigie nano device to imagine it in ways that go outside the norms of scientific data represented in bar graphs and maps. You may also be interested to know that some of the Safecast founders are very into making music! After coming across a post by Forest Mims III on converting scientific data into music, I decided to try converting one of my bGeigie drives into a musical piece. The readings I chose are from my Forest Medicine training in Uenomura, Japan in May, 2019 and I paired the music with a recent trip to Europe which you can listen to and watch here.

Here’s how you can do it too:

STEP 1 – Export Your bGeigie log file

This assumes you have uploaded a bGeigie file!

  1. Go to
  2. Log In
  3. Click Review your bGeigie log file submissions
  4. Toggle the tab in the top right from Everyone to Yours
  5. Choose one of your submissions and click the log
  6. In the top right of the page, click Download Original File

STEP 2 – Convert log file to .csv file 

  1. Rename your log file to use the extension .csv
    • E.g. change 12345.log to 12345.csv
  2. Import your comma-separated file into a spreadsheet
    • Here’s how to do it in Google Spreadsheets:

          1. Navigate to Google Drive
          2. Click New
          3. File Upload
          4. Choose the file from your computer
          5. After the upload is complete, double click on the file
          6. It will open in Google Spreadsheets
  3. Copy the CPM values that you want to convert into a midi file (column D is your CPM readings)

STEP 3 – Convert CPM Readings To Midi File

(Detailed Steps by Forest Mims III are here:

  1. Navigate to MusicalAlgorithms (by Dr. Jonathan Middleton and team) 
  2. Click Compose
  3. Click Import Your Numbers
  4. Paste your CPM numbers from the spreadsheet. Note that there should be a return after each number


  5. Uncheck boxes B, C, D
  6. Click the button Get Algorithm Output
  7. Click the button Scale Values
  8. In the Compose section, do one of the following:
    • Click Play to open a Java-based MIDI player
    • OR Click Save MIDI to download a file

STEP 4 – Optional Mac Garage Band Import (Similar steps for Logic Pro X)

  1. Save the MIDI file
  2. Choose a tempo and click the button Download MIDI
  3. Open Garage Band
  4. Click New Project -> Empty Project
  5. Choose a Track Type -> Software Instrument 
  6. Click Create
  7. Drag the MIDI file you want to import from the Finder to a software instrument track or to the empty area below the existing tracks in the Tracks area.
    The MIDI file appears on one or more software instrument tracks. You can choose the software instrument used to play the MIDI file in the Library.
  8. Play around. Have fun. Share your drive tracks with us!


  • If you are asked to Import Temp, choose No. 
  • If you only see an empty file or one that sounds like clicks, try dragging the MIDI file onto the Garage Band application in your Dock.
  • If you see two tracks – delete the one that doesn’t appear to have any audio.

Anything else that will be helpful? Please comment below.

Brief update on Air Quality

Sun, 10/27/2019 - 03:53

Despite the drastic measure of cutting power to hundreds of thousands (and potentially millions more) of people in efforts prevent wildfires, California is burning again. And with fires comes smoke, enough to close schools across Los Angeles out of concern for air quality and further north the winds are projected to shift and will be blowing smoke on millions of people over the next few days. This on the heals of news that after decades of improvement, air quality in the US is suddenly getting worse. In anticipation of questions on the subject we thought now would be a good time to quickly discuss the state of our air quality monitoring efforts.

USDA Forest Service satellite photo of Northern California smoke from wildfires

In 2012 we began looking at air quality as something that might compliment the radiation data we’d begun publishing a year earlier. However, where radiation monitoring benefits from longstanding agreements on how and what to measure, air quality measurement standards were still actively being debated. Over the following years Safecast produced a number of prototypes to begin looking at the data and thinking about what we could best contribute to an increasingly crowded arena. As it became increasingly clear that particulate matter was the most important thing to look at for both health and environment, as well as the best understood method of measurement, we focused our attention on that and tried to offer some best practices that we’d learned through our radiation measurement efforts. In 2017 we deployed our first generation Air Quality sensors in Los Angeles and we’re currently finishing up production on our next generation solar powered and cellular connected air monitoring devices (a compliment to the Solarcast Nano) which we’ll be deploying and talking more about very soon. Additionally, along with several other organizations we helped to develop the Air Quality Data Commons as a pool of open source and open access air quality data.

Anyone familiar with our work knows that providing easily accessible open data is our primary goal. Last year, for instance, our co-founder Joi Ito wrote a call to arms for Wired about the importance of open data when measuring air quality. There are many air quality monitoring projects, but relatively few are open, which we think will lead to usability, access, and credibility problems down the road. As an example, people often ask us about PurpleAir under the assumption that our projects are similar and therefore complimentary. The people behind the company appear to be well intentioned and they have a useful map. But as PurpleAir’s Terms & Conditions  make clear, it’s not an open project in any sense of the term. This comes as a surprise to many people who who have invested in these devices. You can not legally modify or hack PurpleAir monitors, and the data collected by these devices is owned by PurpleAir, not the customer. PurpleAir is a for-profit company, and if they shut down or are sold to someone else who no longer feels like publishing the data, it can all disappear overnight, and the devices people have purchased could become bricks. As an alternative we’d recommend using and supporting the efforts of OpenAQ, an non-profit organization committed to open publishing. They have a useful map as well. Poorple Air is another interesting project trying to replicate the functionality of a PurpleAir sensor in an open device. This is just a single hack and not a larger project or platform, so it’s usefulness at this point is limited. To understand what you are personally breathing (as opposed to what the air quality of your neighborhood might be) then check out Aircasting/AirBeam project.

Of course our Safecast map shows both our radiation and air quality data, and as we continue to deploy new air sensors they will be represented there as well.

Another Russian Radiation Coverup

Sun, 08/18/2019 - 12:50

Image above: Satellite imagery from PlanetLabs analyzed by researchers at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation studies.

A couple of weeks ago, at the end of July, an interesting paper was released which describes a massive multi-national research effort to determine the location and cause of the mysterious release of radioactive Ruthenium-106 in Eurasia in late September 2017. The paper, titled “Airborne concentrations and chemical considerations of radioactive ruthenium from an undeclared major nuclear release in 2017,” describes it as, “A massive atmospheric release of radioactive 106Ru ….which must have been caused by a sizeable, yet undeclared nuclear accident.” As we noted when we blogged about the incident here and here in November, 2017, several European national radiation labs quickly zeroed in on the Mayak nuclear complex in the Southern Urals region of Russia as the most likely culprit. But both the Russian government and ROSATOM, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, strenuously denied the possibility. Back in November 2017 we noted, “…no-one, neither a government regulator, nor a nuclear facility operator, nor a whistleblower, has yet come forward to own up to the accident.” This is still the case. After almost two years no-one has owned up to it yet, which is stunning, brazen, and extremely indicative.

At the time we also noted an energetic attempt by Russian state-controlled media and industry mouthpieces to discredit the European laboratories that had provided the strongest evidence of Russian responsibility, using the tools of misinformation to misrepresent IAEA statements on the issue. We then learned of attempts by a Rosatom PR agency to enlist European researchers in denouncing as “alarmist and misleading” attempts to blame Russia or Rosatom for the Ru-106 release, and claiming no knowledge whatsoever of where the isotope came from. The letter never subsequently seems to have been published, so this clumsy attempt probably failed to find enough suckers to sign it:


The letter researchers were asked to sign:



We noted in 2017 that the international system of radiation protection and accident response operates essentially on the honor system, which is its achilles heel. By international agreement, operators and national regulators are obliged to notify the international community via the IAEA when a radiation-related accident has occurred. But there are often no real consequences if they don’t. So some, like Russia, habitually don’t. Others insist that they will adhere to the guidelines, and some political accountability systems seem more likely to ensure this, but until an incident occurs we have no way of knowing how each nation will actually behave.

We were in the midst of discussing this news among ourselves when we heard about the new mysterious nuclear-related accident in Russia, on August 8th. After seeing vague and alarming news and blog posts, like this one, people began contacting us to find out what we knew.  The news was that Rosatom confirmed that five of its workers had died in an accident in Nyonoksa, near Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk region, that involved rocket engine tests with an “isotope power source.”  It described a radiation spike and local people buying iodine. But the Russian government itself was silent. Meanwhile video of totally unrelated explosions at old arms depot in Siberia, that included a mushroom-shaped cloud, confused (and continues to confuse) people.

Once again we found ourselves wanting to respond with useable information but faced with a total absence of volunteers in the region. Currently, our nearest data points are about 525km north-northwest near Murmansk and about 550km southwest near St. Petersburg. As far as Safecast data is concerned, Russia, like the People’s Republic of China and several other authoritarian nations, is mainly blank. On our internal chat a senior Safecast member bemoaned:

“…the lack of information (or misinformation) in this case directly parallels why Safecast was started, even if it’s at a dramatically smaller scale:  nuclear release happened, people in the region likely just want their kids to be safe, and the news has wild speculation and no data.”

The fact is that no Russians have stepped forward to volunteer to gather data in that country. This is understandable but regrettable. Russia is not exactly hospitable to citizen activity and quite inhospitable to NGOs. It’s not clear what the risks of arrest or harassment are in that country for people gathering radiation data. The uncertainty itself acts as a powerful discouragement.

Within hours, however, the open-source intelligence (OSINT) community, particularly those that work on nuclear non-proliferation issues like Jeffrey Lewis, Ankit Panda, Melissa Hanham, and Cheryl Rofer , and the organizations they are associated with, had started gathering and analyzing the available information. Lewis tweeted a working hypothesis

“Our working hypothesis is that the event in Russia yesterday was related to Russia’s nuclear-powered cruise missile, the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO name: SSC-X-9 Skyfall).  Possibly a  botched recovery effort involving the Serebryanka.”

They had helpful imagery:

“An August 8 image from @planetlabs showing the Serebryanka, a nuclear fuel carrier, near a missile test site in Russia, where an explosion and fire broke out earlier. The ship’s presence may be related to the testing of a nuclear-powered cruise missile.”

So, the outlines were: cruise missile engine test, isotopic power system of some sort, explosion, dispersal of radioactive material, fatalities, and total coverup.

By the third day, more informative articles were appearing in the Western press, like this one at the New York Times. But the most informative so far has come from Jeffrey Lewis, who is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He laid out what they knew and how they knew it. It’s fascinating and informative reading, and we recommend everyone take a close look at it. Not enough is known, however, to be certain about any of it, and some informed observers are skeptical that the incident is related to the SSC-X-9 Skyfall. It could be a nuclear power unit for some other project, they suggest.

At this point, we still weren’t hearing much about actual radiation data. Except for early reports that radiation near the accident site had spiked, initially described by Russian government spokespeople as, “A brief rise of the radiation level above the natural background,” the public received no actual radiation measurement data.  Behind the scenes, however, we can be certain that the network of researchers at various European labs had been consulting with each other and feverishly comparing notes. About a week later Norway weighed in, announcing that Russia had confirmed that the radioactivity was “up to 16 times higher than normal after an accident at a naval base about 700 kilometres from the Norwegian border.”  This was followed shortly by the announcement that “Norway’s nuclear safety authority is analyzing tiny amounts of radioactive iodine detected in the air in northern Norway in the days after a deadly explosion during a rocket engine test over the border in Russia.”  They had detected trace amounts. If Norway did, then other nations almost certainly have as well. As Cheryl Rofer notes, “In the next few days, we may see analyses of airborne isotopes from European measuring stations. That may give us a little more information….We have very little information. Let’s wait to draw conclusions until we’ve got more.” In recent days data from Russian monitoring stations in Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk has become available, which show spikes of beta radiation activity. Roshydromet, the Russian Federal Weather Service, announced gamma radiation detections from noble gases (Xe, Kr) at one point as well, but other data from them is contradictory. University of Helsinki seismologists reported that they had detected the explosion, at 06:00:28.0 (GMT), or almost precisely 9am local time. Ed Lyman, acting director of the Nuclear Safety Project at the Union of Concerned Scientists, recently tweeted:

“Here’s one consistent picture. The accident affected a small reactor just after startup. The plume was not that hot. The offsite release was primarily volatile fission products — noble gases and iodine. The noble gases dispersed quickly. The iodine was deposited on the ground.”

Ultimately analysis of the available data may help understand the nature of the “isotope power source,” its performance, fuel composition, etc.. Unlike the Mayak Ruthenium 106, this incident has clear international security implications, involving as it does a weapons system under development. In fact, the Russian government reportedly justified not informing the international community more about the accident, telling the IAEA that since the accident involved a non-peaceful use of nuclear radiation, it had no obligation to do so. We expect that as the weeks pass more measurement data will come to light, but little that could be considered “sensitive,” and little if any in the way of ground-level ambient radiation readings from the Sverodvinsk area itself.

By all accounts the locals in Nyonoksa and Sverodvinsk have been subjected to a radioprotection/risk-communication shitshow. It’s a military test area, and we imagine that locals are used to secrecy. Still, they were apparently told nothing at first, but saw hazmat-suited crew carrying casualties away. At one point they were told to evacuate, then that order was rescinded. TASS has said that 20 Arkhangelsk doctors were checked in Moscow, with 91 people in all tested for radiation sickness after treating 3 nuclear accident patients. Other reports claim that the doctors weren’t warned that they were treating nuclear accident victims. These reports are all still a bit foggy, as are reports that FSB agents pressured medical staff to sign non-disclosure agreements. 

All of this says a lot about the impediments to transparency of the sort Safecast tries to encourage. Russia isn’t the only example of nuclear non-transparency, certainly where weapons systems are concerned. We’re lucky that there is a vibrant and knowledgeable OSINT community than can locate and analyze imagery and social media to help decode these vital puzzles for the benefit of everyone. But particularly when accidents occur we think there is no substitute for the empowerment of locals to monitor the places where they live. We don’t get a lot of Russian visitors, and those we have met haven’t asked for bGeigies. Yet. When the time comes we’ll be happy to provide them.

Fukushima cesium-enriched microparticle (CsMP) update

Sat, 08/17/2019 - 09:33

Image above: Secondary electron images from Utsunomiya et al. 2019, of CsMPs discovered in atmospheric particles trapped on a Tokyo air filter from March 15, 2011, with major constituent elements displayed. 

An interesting paper  was recently published by a team headed by Dr. Satoshi Utsunomiya of Kyushu University on the subject of Fukushima-derived cesium-enriched microparticles (CsMPs). As many readers will know, several researchers have located and analyzed these microparticles, in which the cesium is often bonded within glass-like silicates and therefore generally significantly less soluble than other Cs chemical species in water, though technically not actually “insoluble.” After an accident like Fukushima, it is much more common to find cesium in water-soluble compounds like cesium hydroxide (CsOH), and predictions about how quickly the cesium will be dispersed through the environment, in soil, in watersheds, taken up by plants and animals, etc, are based primarily on this assumption. The discovery of sparingly-soluble Fukushima-derived cesium microparticles, first documented by Adachi et al in 2013, and since then confirmed by many others, has raised a number of questions. How abundant are they? Does their presence increase health risk to humans? How much do they reveal about the process of the accident itself? From the standpoint of researchers the microparticles are very intriguing.

Utsunomiya et al.’s paper is titled “Caesium fallout in Tokyo on 15th March, 2011 is dominated by highly radioactive, caesium-rich microparticles,” and as noted in a recent Scientific American article, it was originally accepted for publication in 2017 by Scientific Reports journal. Weeks before publication, however, Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute (TIRI), operated by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, raised objections with Scientific Reports. However no questions about the quality of the science or the validity of the paper’s findings appear to have been brought forward. This in itself was highly irregular. Two years elapsed without resolution, and in March of this year Scientific Reports took the highly unusual step of withdrawing its offer to publish the paper, despite the lack of confirmed evidence that would warrant it. Utsunomiya and several co-authors decided that the best course of action was to place the study in the public domain by publishing it via arXiv, a highly respected pre-print website. The paper is now open and free to download

This study makes a valuable contribution to the body of scientific literature regarding the consequences of the Fukushima disaster in general and CsMPs in particular. I think it was a mistake for Scientific Reports not to publish it two years ago, especially considering the rapid pace of research into these particles and the tremendous interest in them. To summarize the findings briefly, the researchers analyzed air filter samples from March 15, 2011, in Setagaya, Tokyo, when the radioactive plume from Fukushima caused a noticeable peak in airborne radioactivity in the city. The researchers used radiographic imaging (placing the filters on a photographic plate) to identify any highly radioactive spots. Using these images as a guide they were able to isolate seven CsMPs, which they subjected to atomic-scale analysis using high-resolution electron microscopy (HRTEM) to identify their nano-scale structure and chemical composition. Based on these detailed measurements and quantitative analysis, the researchers concluded that 80-89% of the total cesium fallout in Tokyo that day was in the form of highly radioactive microparticles. The second half of the paper is devoted to estimates of how long such particles might be retained in the human lungs if inhaled, based on previous studies that reported the effects of inhalation of non-radioactive atmospheric particles, and some possible physical consequences. The paper is valuable for the quantitative analysis of the Tokyo particles alone, since it is one of few studies that deal with the issue for Tokyo specifically. Research into possible health consequences of the particles, meanwhile, has gained momentum while the paper remained unpublished, using approaches such as stochastic biokinetics, and DNA damage studies.  In a recent paper, Utsunomiya and colleagues produced estimates of the rate of dissolution of the particles inside the human lung, in pure water, and in seawater. A working group at the Japan Health Physics Society has also devoted attention to the issue, noting the need for further study of the risk from intake of these particles, particularly to the lung.  Likewise, others have been studying the particles to learn about the accident progression and possible consequences for decommissioning.

Why did Tokyo Metropolitan Industrial Technology Research Institute object to the paper’s publication? When we first heard that publication of the paper was being held up by Tokyo Metropolitan Government, we thought politically-motivated suppression was a likely explanation. Since then the public has learned that the actual complaint given to Scientific Reports stems from a chain of custody issue of the original air filter samples. We don’t want to speculate further about Tokyo’s motivation, because we have seen no direct evidence yet of political suppression in this case. But based on past occurrences with other government institutions, we would find it plausible. We will let readers know if TIRI responds to our inquiries.

We spoke with Dr. Utsunomiya and co-author Dr. Rodney Ewing recently. I was aware of their co-authorship of several strong papers on CsMPs, including Utsunomiya’s plenary talk at the Goldschmidt Conference in Yokohama in 2016, which I attended. I asked how this new arXiv paper fits in with their other papers, and where they think this research is heading next:

Satoshi Utsunomiya:

Thank you for asking. The Tokyo paper was actually our first paper regarding CsMPs. As I mentioned, the paper was accepted two years ago. There were no previous papers of ours on CsMPs that time. Currently we are working on several topics on CsMPs. I cannot reveal the content yet, as we are thinking about a press release for the next paper. But I think it is important to continue this kind of research, providing some insights for decommissioning at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Azby Brown:

I didn’t realize that this was your first paper on the subject.  How does it relate to the one presented at the Goldschmidt Conference in Yokohama in 2016? “Cesium-Rich Micro-Particles Unveil the Explosive Events in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.” Didn’t that paper receive a prize?


My talk at Goldschmidt briefly covered the story described in the two papers that were accepted for publication at the same time. One was published in Scientific Reports. The other one was not published. There was no prize. It was a plenary talk.


I see. I recall that it received a lot of attention. Now it makes more sense to me.

Can you tell me a little bit about the specific characteristics and focus of your research, and how it differs from papers like Adachi 2013, Abe 2014, etc? Generally speaking, that is. I’d like to help people understand the different aspects of the field.


Adachi reported the discovery of CsMPs. Abe demonstrated X-ray absorption analysis on the CsMPs. We focused on the nanotexture inside CsMPs. We are particularly interested in the detailed evidence remaining within the microparticle, which can provide useful information on the development of the chemical reactions during the meltdowns, because it is still difficult to directly analyze the materials inside the reactors. We, for the first time, succeeded in performing isotopic analysis on individual CsMPs. More specifically, the occurrence of uranium can directly tell the story of how the fuel melted. Our research has two directions: one is to understand the environmental impact of CsMPs, and the other is to provide useful information on the debris properties to help decommissioning at FDNPP. We are also interested in the implications for health.


Can you tell me a little bit about your working relationship? Satoshi went to the US to work in your lab, right Rod? When was that, and what were you working on?

Rod Ewing:

Satoshi and I have known each other since 2000, when he joined my research group as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Michigan. He was a member of the research group until 2007. We collaborated on a wide range of topics that had to do with radioactive materials, such as the transport of plutonium at the Mayak site in Russia to the identification of uranium phases within C60 cages, so called buckyballs, that were formed and released from coal power plants. Once Satoshi returned to Japan to take his position at Kyushu University, we continued to collaborate, particularly on topics related to Fukushima Daiichi.


How did you both get interested in CsMPs?


Once discovered, CsMPs were clearly of high interest. They had not been noted in earlier reactor accidents. Satoshi is a master with the transmission electron microscope – exactly the tool/technique needed to study these particles.


For people who aren’t familiar with what’s involved in a research experiment like yours, can you describe the overall process? What were the technical challenges?


I would just emphasize that it is very difficult to find and characterize these particles. Considering the full literature and efforts by others as well as our team – the results are impressive. It is rare to have both the TEM characterization and the isotopic data.


As Rod mentioned, it is difficult to obtain both TEM and isotopic data from a few micron-sized spots. The isolation of CsMPs from soils is a time consuming process. But to date, many scientists have found and isolated CsMPs. The important thing is what information we can obtain from the analysis of CsMPs. We have been taking various approaches to elucidate the properties, environmental impact, and the role in releasing fissile actinides to the environment.    

As described above, many papers examining various aspects of Fukushima-derived cesium microparticles have been published since they were first identified in 2013. Even so, important aspects remain only partially documented and understood to date. Below is a partial list of relevant publications.

Papers mentioned in this article:

Caesium fallout in Tokyo on 15th March, 2011 is dominated by highly radioactive, caesium-rich microparticles

Utsunomiya, et al., 2019


Emission of spherical cesium-bearing particles from an early stage of the Fukushima nuclear accident

Adachi et al., 2013


Detection of Uranium and Chemical State Analysis of Individual Radioactive Microparticles Emitted from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Using Multiple Synchrotron Radiation X-ray Analyses

Abe et al., 2014


Dissolution of radioactive, cesium-rich microparticles released from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in simulated lung fluid, pure-water, and seawater

Suetake et al., 2019


Development of a stochastic biokinetic method and its application to internal dose estimation for insoluble cesium-bearing particles

Manabe & Matsumoto, 2019


DNA damage induction during localized chronic exposure to an insoluble radioactive microparticle

Matsuya et al., 2019


Provenance of uranium particulate contained within Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 ejecta material

Martin et al., 2019


Internal doses from radionuclides and their health effects following the Fukushima accident

Ishikawa et al., 2018


Related papers (by year of publication):

Characteristics Of Spherical Cs-Bearing Particles Collected During The Early Stage Of FDNPP Accident

Igarashi et al., 2014


Radioactive Cs in the severely contaminated soils near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

Kaneko et al., 2015


First successful isolation of radioactive particles from soil near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

Satou et al., 2016


Internal structure of cesium-bearing radioactive microparticles released from Fukushima nuclear power plant

Yamaguchi et al., 2016


Three-Year Retention Of Radioactive Caesium In The Body Of Tepco Workers Involved In The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident

Nakano et al., 2016


Monte Carlo Evaluation of Internal Dose and Distribution Imaging Due to Insoluble Radioactive Cs-Bearing Particles of Water Deposited Inside Lungs via Pulmonary Inhalation Using PHITS Code Combined with Voxel Phantom Data

Sakama, M. et al., 2016


Radioactively-hot particles detected in dusts and soils from Northern Japan by combination of gamma spectrometry, autoradiography, and SEM/EDS analysis and implications in radiation risk assessment

Kaltofen & Gundersen, 2017


Caesium-rich micro-particles: A window into the meltdown events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

Furuki et al., 2017


Isotopic signature and nano-texture of cesium-rich micro-particles: Release of uranium and fission products from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

Imoto et al., 2017


Uranium dioxides and debris fragments released to the environment with cesium-rich microparticles from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

Ochiai et al., 2018


Novel method of quantifying radioactive cesium-rich microparticles (CsMPs) in the environment from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

Ikehara et al., 2018


Formation of radioactive cesium microparticles originating from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident: characteristics and perspectives

Ohnuki, Satou, and Utsunomiya, 2019